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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-3732 
_____________ 
 
FITZROY GERALD GREEN, 
                                      Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                           Respondent 
______________ 
 
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF  
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 
(Agency No. A099-232-461) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Margaret R. Reichenberg                     
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 10, 2012 
____________ 
 
Before: RENDELL, SMITH and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  July 13, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
 Fitzroy Green (“Green”) petitions for review of the BIA‟s denial of his application 
for deferred removal under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  
 2 
For the following reasons, the petition will be denied. 
I.  Background 
A.  Removability Determination 
 Green, a native and citizen of Jamaica, entered the United States on a tourist visa 
in 2002.  On September 16, 2006, his immigration status was adjusted to that of a lawful 
permanent resident.  Less than a month later, on October 13, 2006, he was arrested on 
charges of possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute.  He 
pled guilty in New Jersey state court and was sentenced to one year of probation.  In 
2008, Green was arrested again on charges of possession and distribution of a controlled 
dangerous substance.  He again pled guilty, and was sentenced to six months‟ 
imprisonment and two years‟ probation.  On May 28, 2010, the Department of Homeland 
Security charged him with being removable from the United States under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), as an alien who had been convicted of a controlled substance offense.  
Green admitted his prior convictions and raised no cognizable challenge to his 
removability, and the IJ found him removable as charged.   
B.  CAT Application 
 Following the IJ‟s determination that he was removable, Green filed an application 
for deferred removal under CAT.  In a subsequent hearing on his application, Green 
testified that he feared that he would be tortured by the Shower Posse, a powerful 
Jamaican drug gang formerly headed by Christopher “Dudus” Coke, if he were deported 
to Jamaica.  He explained that sometime in 1998 or 1999, while visiting his godmother at 
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a Kingston-area hospital, he witnessed a group of gunmen burst into a nearby hospital 
room and shoot a suspected police informant and the police officer who had been 
assigned to guard him, killing both men.  Green recognized three of the assailants as 
members of the Shower Posse, and despite initially refusing to discuss the killings with 
police, he eventually gave a statement in which he identified the shooters.  One of the 
shooters was subsequently arrested and convicted of murder, although Green was not 
asked to testify at the trial.  According to Green, Jamaican police also arrested at least 
one, and maybe both, of the other shooters. 
Green testified that as a result of his cooperation in this investigation, he and his 
family became targets of the Shower Posse.  His sister, Winsome, was killed in 2001 or 
2002, and his brother, Cleon,
1
 was killed in 2009.  Green testified to his belief that both 
slayings were acts of retribution carried out by members of the Shower Posse.  
Additionally, in 2002, Green himself was attacked in downtown Kingston by four men 
wielding knives and machetes, men he believes were Shower Posse gang members.  
Green sustained multiple stab wounds and spent the night in a hospital, but he did not 
report the attack to police.  Several months after this attack, in July of 2002, Green left 
Jamaica for the United States and has not returned since.   
C.  IJ and BIA Decisions 
 Although the IJ found Green‟s testimony to be credible, she ultimately denied his 
                                                 
1
 Although Green‟s brother is referred to as “Clan” at various points in the Administrative 
Record, we refer to him as “Cleon,” as that is the spelling Green provided during his 
sworn testimony before the IJ.  (A.R. at 107.) 
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application for deferred removal under CAT.  She reasoned that even assuming arguendo 
that the Shower Posse still sought revenge against Green for his cooperation with 
authorities thirteen years ago, he had “failed to meet his burden to establish that the 
Shower Posse would be acting on behalf of the government of Jamaica or that the 
government of Jamaica would acquiesce in the actions of the Shower Posse,” as required 
under CAT.  (A.R. at 40.)  Green appealed this decision to the BIA, which affirmed the 
IJ‟s ruling on the same ground, stating that Green “ha[d] not met his burden to establish 
that the government would turn a blind eye to the actions of the Shower Posse.”  (Id. at 
3.)  On October 4, 2011, Green timely petitioned for review.   
II.  Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
 Generally, we have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) to review a final order 
of the BIA denying relief under CAT.  However, in cases involving certain categories of 
criminal aliens—including aliens, like Green, who are removable due to controlled 
substance offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)—the statute provides that “no court 
shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  
Although it goes on to state that we may review “constitutional claims or questions of 
law,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), we lack jurisdiction to review factual findings underlying 
a removal order against an alien who has committed a controlled substance offense.   
When the BIA issues its own opinion, we generally review that decision as the 
final agency decision.  Sarango v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 651 F.3d 380, 383 (3d Cir. 
2011).  Here, however, the BIA‟s opinion “invokes specific aspects of the IJ‟s analysis 
 5 
and fact-finding in support of [its] conclusions,” and so we are obliged to review both the 
decisions of the IJ and the BIA.  Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 613 (3d Cir. 2005).  We 
review conclusions of law de novo, but give Chevron deference to the BIA‟s 
interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  Sarango, 651 F.3d at 383. 
III.  Discussion 
 Green raises three arguments in his petition.  First, he challenges the IJ‟s factual 
determination that potential retribution carried out by the Shower Posse would not be 
attributable to the Jamaican government.  Second, he asserts that neither the BIA nor the 
IJ “complete[d] the two-pronged analysis as mandated by this Court” in Kaplun v. 
Attorney General of the United States, 602 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2010).  (Pet‟r‟s Br. 8.)  And 
third, he claims that “neither the BIA nor the IJ considered the totality of the evidence 
relevant to the likelihood of [his] torture.”  (Id. at 9.)  None of these arguments has merit. 
A.  Involvement of Jamaican Government 
 Article 3 of CAT provides that “[n]o State Party shall . . . expel, return („refouler‟) 
or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing 
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”  Art. 3(1), S. Treaty Doc. No. 
100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.  Relying on the administrative regulations implementing 
CAT, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1), we have stated: 
For an act to constitute torture under the [CAT] . . . , it must be: (1) an act 
causing severe physical or mental pain or suffering; (2) intentionally 
inflicted; (3) for an illicit or proscribed purpose; (4) by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official who has custody 
or physical control of the victim; and (5) not arising from lawful sanctions. 
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Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 671 F.3d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation 
omitted).  Both the IJ and the BIA found that Green had failed to satisfy the fourth of 
these factors: the requirement of government involvement or acquiescence in torture.  In 
his petition, Green argues that these findings amount to “judicial error and abused 
discretion.”  (Pet‟r‟s Br. 13.)   
 This argument is aimed directly at the IJ‟s factual determination, which was 
adopted by the BIA, that the Jamaican government would not consent to or acquiesce in 
potential retributive violence carried out by the Shower Posse.  As mentioned above, 
however, our jurisdiction over final orders of removal is limited to “constitutional claims 
or questions of law.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  Recognizing this statutory limitation, we 
have repeatedly stated that “[w]e do not have jurisdiction to ascertain whether [a] factual 
finding was supported by substantial evidence.”  Santos-Reyes v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 
660 F.3d 196, 200 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 634 
(3d Cir. 2006) (“[F]actual or discretionary determinations continue to fall outside the 
jurisdiction of the court of appeals entertaining a petition for review.”); Alaka v. Att’y 
Gen. of the U.S., 456 F.3d 88, 103 (3d Cir. 2006) (“We do not have jurisdiction to review 
the merits of the IJ‟s factual conclusion[.]”).  Thus, we lack jurisdiction to consider 
Green‟s argument that the IJ erred in determining that the Jamaican government would 
not consent to or acquiesce in the Shower Posse‟s actions.2 
                                                 
2
 We note, however, that even if we did have jurisdiction to consider this argument, the 
IJ‟s finding appears to be supported by substantial evidence.  Although the IJ recognized 
that the Shower Posse “does exert strong influence in parts of Jamaica, particularly in the 
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B.  Kaplun Test 
 Green next argues that the IJ and BIA failed to apply the two-prong test 
undertaken by our Court in Kaplun.  In Kaplun, we stated that whether future torture was 
likely turned on two questions: “(1) what is likely to happen to the petitioner if removed; 
and (2) does what is likely to happen amount to the legal definition of torture?”  602 F.3d 
at 271.  In reviewing Green‟s CAT application, the IJ assumed arguendo that the Shower 
Posse would try to harm Green, and then based her decision on the fact that this potential 
harm would not meet the legal definition of torture due to the lack of government 
involvement or acquiescence.  The BIA followed the same approach, assuming a 
likelihood of harm under the first Kaplun prong and then determining that this harm 
would not meet the legal definition of torture under the second Kaplun prong.  Green 
complains that it was error to assume harm under the first prong of the test and that the IJ 
and BIA instead were required to make an actual factual finding on that point. 
 This is a legal argument which we have jurisdiction to consider.  The argument, 
however, is unconvincing for several reasons.  First, Green failed to raise this Kaplun 
argument before the BIA, and a strong case can be made that he has not exhausted his 
administrative remedies and thus cannot raise the argument here for the first time.  See 8 
                                                                                                                                                             
poorer areas of Kingston, and that there is corruption within the government of Jamaica,” 
(A.R. at 40), she noted several facts which indicated that the Jamaican government would 
not acquiesce in torture carried out by the gang: (1) Jamaican law provides penalties for 
corruption; (2) Jamaican authorities pursued and arrested several Shower Posse members 
who participated in the killings witnessed by Green, and at least one suspect was tried 
and convicted of murder;  and (3) Christopher “Dudus” Coke, the longtime leader of the 
Shower Posse, was apprehended by Jamaican authorities in 2010 and extradited to the 
United States to stand trial on drug trafficking and racketeering charges. 
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U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Lin v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 543 F.3d 114, 120-21 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Even if he can raise this argument, however, Kaplun does not “specifically require[]” the 
IJ to make an actual finding as to each prong of the test.  (Pet‟r‟s Br. 11.)  Rather, Kaplun 
states only that “there are two distinct parts” to the analysis and that “[t]he two parts 
should be examined separately.”  602 F.3d at 271.  Green bears the burden of showing 
both that he would likely suffer harm if returned to Jamaica and that the harm would 
amount to the legal definition of torture.  Because the IJ and the BIA determined that 
Green had failed to satisfy the second prong of the Kaplun test, there was no need to 
make a factual finding as to the first prong.  See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 
(1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on 
issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).  Accordingly, 
Green‟s argument that the IJ and BIA misapplied Kaplun is without merit.  
C.  Consideration of All Evidence in Record 
 Finally, Green argues that the IJ and BIA committed legal error by ignoring 
relevant evidence in the record tending to support his position that the Jamaican 
government turns a blind eye to the criminal acts of the Shower Posse.  Green is correct 
that “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture” must be considered in 
reviewing a CAT application.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3).  However, his argument on this 
point fails because he never identifies any evidence that was overlooked.  Instead, he 
revisits his argument that the IJ and BIA “misinterpreted the country condition research,” 
“erred in finding that the evidence „falls short‟” of satisfying CAT requirements, and 
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“rule[d] contrary to the substantial country condition research.”  (Pet‟r‟s Br. 18, 19, 22.)  
It is therefore apparent that Green‟s real argument is not that relevant evidence was 
ignored, but rather that the IJ incorrectly weighed evidence in making factual 
determinations.  As stated above, however, we lack jurisdiction to consider such an 
argument. 
Moreover, we are persuaded that the IJ did consider all relevant record evidence in 
rendering her decision.  In support of his application, Green testified at length and 
submitted documentary evidence in the form of country reports and newspaper articles 
describing the gang culture in Jamaica and corruption within the country‟s government.   
Green himself admits that the IJ “accepted” his testimony and “gave credence to the U.S. 
Department of State report which relates that the Shower Posse „exerts a strong influence 
within certain areas of Jamaica.‟”  (Id. at 11.)  Moreover, although the IJ‟s opinion did 
not specifically discuss every individual piece of evidence, the IJ made clear that she had 
“[c]onsider[ed] all of the evidence of record.”  (A.R. at 40.)  This is all that is required, as 
we have previously stated that the IJ and BIA need not “discuss every piece of evidence 
mentioned by an asylum applicant.”  Huang v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 620 F.3d 372, 388 
(3d Cir. 2010).  The IJ cannot be said to have ignored relevant record evidence, and 
Green‟s argument on this point is unpersuasive.  
IV.  Conclusion 
 In sum, we discern no reason to disturb the decision of the BIA.  Accordingly, 
Green‟s petition will be denied. 
